What the U.S.-North Korean summit might yield

OPINION:

As the second United States-North Korean summit gets underway in Vietnam, expectations are uncertain. It’s no secret that President Donald Trump’s penchant for productive disruption to the — unproductive — policy of previous administrations has unnerved the staid diplomats in Foggy Bottom. The first summit in Singapore last June met with skepticism from the president’s avowed and ardent critics.

They were overly pessimistic. Missile testing was halted. U.S. hostages were set free by the totalitarian government of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The remains of Korean War U.S. servicemen were returned home. The pinstriped sages of failed diplomacy during the past three administrations produced scant success. The difference? Mr. Trump exerted the boldness necessary to achieve results, embracing the example of Winston Churchill, who exhibited what Larry Arnn of Hillsdale College calls, “the profound significance of human choice, and the sublime responsibility of men.”

The president’s critics are eager to pounce on this summit as “unproductive,” as if anything previous to the first Trump initiative had been productive. But Mr. Trump has generated optimism — possibly too exuberantly — that he can compel Mr. Kim to relinquish his nuclear and missile inventory. His sagacity in seeing the opportunity to resolve the North Korean threat has put him on a path where efficacious results can and should be expected. This summit is another step in that direction.

It’s highly unlikely that Mr. Kim will depart Hanoi agreeing to surrender his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But he has much at stake, including a pathetic economy, the misery of his people and a need to placate the circumambient generals in his ruling circle who assure his survival. He wants help and money. Lots of it. Consequently, Mr. Kim will drive a hard bargain. Mr. Trump is equal to the challenge and should press him for a deal.

Here are some ideas the president can proffer only if Mr. Kim agrees unambiguously to the U.S. definition of denuclearization and reveals the number and location of his nuclear and missile stocks:

First, offer to expand the 160 miles long and 2.5 miles wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that runs across the Korean peninsula. Established in 1953, it is a no-man’s-land where only limited numbers of military observers from both sides monitor the peace, but excludes larger forces. The United States — in consultation with South Korea — should suggest expanding the DMZ 30 miles south to the outskirts of Seoul and an equal distance north of the zone.

An enlarged DMZ — with verification inspections — would further reduce tensions. More significantly, it would require North Korea to also exclude from the expanded DMZ thousands of deadly cannons and rocket launchers positioned in hardened artillery sites (HARTS) that can currently range Seoul, threatening the capital with massive destruction. Likewise, the United States and South Korea would need to agree to remove comparable military capability. This would be a significant offer to advance peace and a major confidence-building measure on both sides of the DMZ.

Second, getting North Korea to hand over its WMD likely will occur only in stages. In the past, the vacuous U.S. approach was to provide food and other emergency aid prior to implementing compliance measures. That clearly failed to achieve better behavior by the Hermit Kingdom. The president should consider creating a “denuclearization incentive bank” and place “on deposit” for future U.S. distribution, agricultural, medical, energy, trade and financial assistance directly and verifiably linked to North Korea’s acceptance of the U.S. definition of denuclearization and completion of a comprehensive inventory of all WMD provided to our negotiators.

Third, the United States should offer to immediately establish a Joint Commission on Korean Denuclearization (JCKD) to verify the location, inventory, transfer and shipping of all WMD to a U.S.-selected site for destruction. The commission should be led by the United States with observers from China, South Korea and North Korea. This could be accompanied with an agreement by both Koreas to prohibit the deployment of WMD by any other nation on the peninsula.

Finally, the United States should — only after North Korea agrees to U.S. denuclearization terms, an expanded DMZ, the incentive package tied to verifiable nuclear disarmament, and the joint commission — establish full diplomatic relations with North Korea. The planets are aligned now with a U.S. president determined to lead, an international community weary of a nuclearized North Korea, and a Kim Jong-un seeking to survive.

Bold diplomacy by the president can produce the sublime results a Churchill would have been proud to achieve. Mr. Trump must not allow Mr. Kim to slow-roll negotiations with minuscule offers to play nicely. There must be demonstrated achievements toward denuclearization — maybe not immediately — but measurable progress, nonetheless. If the president’s offers are accepted and he secures denuclearization, he will at once have demonstrated his meliorism, while silencing his unrelenting and disbelieving critics in Washington. Who knows, this may turn out to be quite “Nobel.”

• L. Scott Lingamfelter is a retired U.S. Army colonel, combat veteran and Middle East Foreign Area Officer. He also served in the Virginia General Assembly.