CAROL A. TABER: “Verification” in the Iran deal is even more of a scam than you thought

OPINION:

What happens if the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors want access to a site and the Iranians refuse?

Much has been made of the absurd 24 days in which Iran can delay the inspection to cover up a violation. In addition, Sections Q.75-76 of Annex 1 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan mandate a program of back and forth maneuvering between Iran and the IAEA before the “original request for access” in Section Q.78 begins the 24 day period. A thorough consideration of this program indicates that Iran can turn this into quite a complicated ballet.

From the moment the IAEA first asks the Iranian government why particular sites are closed to inspection, Iran can stretch out the period between that initial “request for clarifications” and the “original request for access” to a length that is left undetermined by the Plan. And Iran will probably get a warning from its own or another intelligence service before the request for clarifications is brought up for discussion at the IAEA. So the time span between the moment that Iran understands there will be a challenge to the closed status of a site and the time when there is a chance for the IAEA’s access is more like a month and a half rather than the already suspiciously stretched-out 24 days.

But what really makes the verification process a deception is the make-up of the Joint Commission that is tasked to adjudicate a dispute about access.

According to Annex 4, if Iran refuses to allow access to any site, the issue is decided by the Joint Commission. Neither Israel nor any of Iran’s Arab neighbors are allowed a representative on the Commission. There are eight voting members of the Commission: Iran, America, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the High Representative of the [European] Union.

If Iran votes against the inspection, and the representatives of Russia and China and either the High Representative or the representative of France merely abstain or just choose not to show up for the meeting, the result is that the inspection is not permitted. It is expected that Russia (through its contemplated huge arms sales to Iran) and China (through its declared intention to develop Iranian oil fields as well as to purchase vast quantities of Iranian oil) either will support Iran, abstain, or just not show up.

According to Annex 4, the Coordinator of the Commission will be the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the EU, Federica Mogherini. Her appointment to the EU position was strongly opposed by East European and Baltic members of the EU who regarded her as too pro-Russian.  Ms. Mogherini began her political career as an activist in the fiercely anti-Israel youth federation of the Italian Communist Party. In the CPI’s successor parties (the PDS, DS, and PD) Mogherini rose to a high position as a foreign policy bureaucrat.

In 2002 at the height of the war organized by Yasser Arafat against Israel (which killed over 700 Israeli civilians in terrorist attacks), Ms. Mogherini travelled to Ramallah to support Mr. Arafat and pose with him for a famous picture that she kept on the wall of her office. In 2012 she proudly posted the picture on her blog.  Ms. Mogherini was to a large degree responsible for the Iran deal, and she has a great vested interest in its “success”. She sits on the Joint Commission as its leader and a voting member. (Her term will not be completed until the end of 2019.)

Iran will receive $150 billion dollars at the outset of the deal and then will receive hundreds of billions dollars more from future oil revenues. This gives them an enormous fund to bribe European politicians and their backers. Saddam Hussein was able to make a joke of the sanctions on his regime by bribes to and favors for European politicians – even assigning to them Iraqi oil to sell for their own profit. Huge bribes will be paid by business interests in Commission countries to their own politicians to get them to look the other way. These interests will then be rewarded by Iran with lucrative concessions.

The Iranian leadership has assured its people that there will never be any inspection of any military sites. The make-up of the Commission guarantees there never will be such an inspection.

Annex 3 of the Plan commits the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany to take steps to protect Iran’s nuclear program from Israeli sabotage. Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that this includes cyber sabotage. The “verification” sections of Annex 1 and Annex 4 are further confirmation that the purpose of the Plan is not to end, but to protect, Iran’s nuclear weapons program in return for profits by Western business conglomerates and Russian military exporters.

Even if this comes at the cost of greatly increasing the nuclear threat to their own nations by ending the sanctions on Iran’s long-range ballistic missile programs.

Carol A. Taber is president of FamilySecurityMatters.org.